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Species vs. Genus in the Romantic Novel: 
Warren's World Enough and Time 
Robert Siegle 
Though at first glance a reasonable enough label, the term 
"romantic novel" becomes increasingly contradictory the more 
one examines it. The two halves of the term draw upon opposed 
connotations and hence seem more like contraries than the 
orderly relation of species to genus implied in the term. Typically, 
the history of the novel is thought to begin with the emergence of 
"formal realism," 1 and a concern for the "details" and "particulars" 
of experience is assumed to be its "generic comrnitment." 2 On the 
other hand, the word "romantic" connotes a greater emphasis 
upon the imaginative than the rational, the subjective rather than 
the objective. Indeed, in the most extended treatment of the 
romantic novel, Robert Kiely characterizes the form as a 
"battleground." As he puts it, "theories, techniques of craft, and 
moral imperatives related to the cultivation of imagination and the 
supremacy of the self collided with those associated with reason 
and public welfare." 3 
Such a collision is familiar to students of American literature, 
particularly since Richard Chase's classic discussion of romance 
and realism. He describes romance as being dominant in 
American fiction and as eschewing the "ordinary novelistic 
requirements of verisimilitude, development, and continuity" in 
order "to plunge into the underside of consciousness" rather than 
remain in the daylight world of "the spectacle of man in society." 4 
The combination of these two elements in the romantic novel thus 
gives us the conflict between the "novelistic requirements" of 
realism and "the cultivation of imagination and the supremacy of 
the self." To this conceptual tension, however, we must add an 
equivalent formal strain, for, as Kiely observes, "in nearly every 
case one has a sense of unresolved struggle, of intelligence and 
energy at odds."5 In defining the "dynamic antagonism" released 
in the best examples of the romantic novel, Kiely notes that 
although romantic novels do have structural patterns, 
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character types, and situations in common, their primary 
tendency is to destroy (or, at the very least, undermine) 
particular narrative conventions. Romantic novels thrive like 
parasites on structures whose ruin is the source of their life." 
The romantic novel is thus a doubly divided form fighting both a 
civil war among its conflicting romantic and realistic ideologies, 
and something like a war of colonial liberation against the ruling 
narrative conventions with which Kiely finds it colliding. 
That such conflicts can create enduring critical problems is 
evident in the responses one finds to a work like Wuthering 
Heights . One hardly knows whether the first generation of 
characters are human or are scarcely definable elemental forces, 
while the second generation appear to be faint parodies of their 
seniors. Where in the range suggested between elemental forces 
and socialized beings does the self lie? Or consider Poe's The 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym and its proliferation of symbolic 
possibilities at the end, all dashing to incoherent destruction 
along with the perhaps enlightened protagonist, lost in the 
cataract at the feet of a great white figure which remains 
conceptually stranded between the realism of the genus and the 
romance of the species. 
Moreover, as one thinks through various examples of the 
romantic novel, one finds these formal and conceptual tensions 
taking repeatedly the form of a single issue: the grounds of 
selfhood. These grounds may be located within, as in the all but 
mystical metaphysical sense of identity implied in Wuthering 
Heights; they may be located in Sir Walter Scott's middle ground 
whereon the protagonist negotiates his way among conflicting 
social orders; they may be located in Poe's search to relate the self 
to an ultimate cosmic principle. But however the romantic novelist 
mediates among these contending grounds of selfhood, his 
narrative resolution is complicated both thematically and 
technically by his conflicting allegiances to both genus and 
species. Whether the protagonist heeds an inner light, fulfills the 
duties assigned him by society, or subordinates himself to a 
higher or ultimate being, he is defined through the conflicts 
inherent in the romantic novel. 
Though one may identify a number of fruitful suggestions 
towards a perspective on this perplexing form, possibly the most 
penetrating study is found in a novel of our own century, Robert 
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Penn Warren's World Enough and Time (1950). The passage of both histo 
literary and nonliterary history since the classic nineteenth- indet 
century exemplars introduces some ironic distance into this text, possi 
suggesting that Warren's subtitle, "A Romantic Novel," may be sort< 
more an allusion than an identification, in effect quoting the chan 
tradition but with a critical difference. Nonetheless, the narrative often 
works closely with the antinomies in this species of the novel. roma 
Indeed, Robert B. Heilman's extraordinary review of World Enough nove 
and Time when it first appeared clearly expresses Warren's version ahea, 
of the basic tension we have outlined; he describes the novel as 
charting 
the failure of a private, subjective "ideal" realm to come to 
terms with, to be integrated with, to be married to a realm of 
public life and activity, the realm of politics and society and Thes1 
group action, of law and justice. 7 nece: 
his to 
Most critics follow in Heilman's wake, accepting as a satisfactory halvi 
summary of the novel's theme the division made by its and 1 
protagonist, Jeremiah Beaumont, between the "Idea" and the But G 
"World." 8 However, the work's narrative complexity and figurative does 
variations on this theme suggest that Warren's allusion is more a it. 
troubled inquiry into the relationships between conceptual and Th 
formal antinomies than a simple reiteration of them. Indeed, the 
"unresolved struggle" Kiely finds throughout the romantic novel 
is foregrounded here in a way that challenges the assumptions of 
both its tributaries. Not only do we have a dark version of the 
American Adam trying to narrate a justification of his life, but we 
also have a modem historian looking over his shoulder, as it were, 
trying to make sense of both Jeremiah's act of interpretation and 
that which he anticipates on the part of the reader. Would-be 
swashbuckler and scholarly historian, the diary of selfhood and 
the study of social facts - the contraries come to the surface in 
anything but a peaceful integration or marriage, to recur to 
Heilman's metaphors. 9 Ultimately the novel plays off these 
contraries to redefine them in ways less naive metaphysically than 
the precedents to which it responds. 
The narrator introduces almost immediately the concerns we 
have located in the nature of the romantic novel. As he is an 
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historian, one would anticipate his allegiance to realism, and 
indeed his method in general is to get the reader as close as 
possible to the "historical facts" of the case.10 But he is a romantic 
sort of historian, much given to emotional relations with his 
characters and, more importantly, to figurative language that 
often introduces into his objective and realistic account the 
romantic novel's imaginative disruption of such forms. In the 
novel's second paragraph, for example, he muses over the project 
ahead of him in terms that bear directly on the problems at hand: 
We have what is left, the lies and half-lies and the truths and 
half-truths. We do not know that we have the Truth. But we 
must have it. 11 
These sentences represent a conventional gesture towards the 
necessary element of uncertainty as one comes to grips with 
historical materials like Beaumont's journal. By pluralizing and 
halving truths and lies, he accounts rigorously for the relativities 
and uncertainties plaguing the struggle to set right the record. 
But other tendencies of this historian also show here, for not only 
does he capitalize Truth as an absolute, but he visibly hungers for 
it. 
That is, if Truth is his goal, then his difficulty in achieving it is a 
question of the integrity of witnesses, the abilities of the 
historian, and other such empirical limitations- Truth is there, it 
would seem, but simply a problem to reach. Such an expectation 
is basic to both romance and realism, though they work for it in 
different ways, but the assumption separates our narrator from 
the modern professional historian who has no naive belief that his 
venture is other than interpretation. This narrator, however, tells 
us that "we must have it." What he means by this phrase is 
ambiguous, and that ambiguity becomes increasingly significant 
as the novel proceeds and the "facts" become more difficult to 
ascertain. Does he mean "must" in the sense that we necessarily 
have it in the documents themselves (it must be there)? If so, he is 
a true believer in the word of the primary text (Beaumont's 
journal) and the most naive and credulous of historians, one who 
takes the realistic element of the "romantic novel" to its furthest 
conceptual extreme. Perhaps, however, "must" connotes the 
desperate desire to hold Truth absolute and pure (I must have 
certainty!); the very desperation here imperils the historian's 
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objectivity and realism, for it parallels Jeremiah's ultimately 
unscrupulous pursuit of the Idea. Or, finally, does "must" refer 
not to the desire to have truth at any cost, but rather to a kind of 
ontological necessity to have truth as a condition of survival (as 
one must have food and water)? If so, we have moved to the very 
extremity of the romantic preoccupation with an ultimate nature 
of man and cosmos, knowable by means of the imagination, a 
pole of certainty as absolute as that of the documentary realist of 
the first of these three readings, but which emphasizes the 
subjective process rather than the objective record of facts. 
This spread of contrary potentials in the passage repeats that 
division of loyalties we have found at the heart of this genre, and 
it is confirmed repeatedly as one moves on through the text. The 
next sentences of this same paragraph, for example, give us two 
quite crucial metaphors for the whole venture on which the 
narrator is embarking, metaphors which in fact present 
considerable difficulties to any effort to take them as a simple 
form of signification. The narrator continues: 
Puzzling over what is left, we are like the scientist fumbling 
with a tooth and thigh bone to reconstruct for a museum 
some great, stupid beast extinct with the ice age. Or we are 
like the louse-bit nomad who finds, in a fold of land between 
his desert and the mountains, the ruin of parapets and 
courts, and marvels what kind of men had held the world 
before him. But at least we have the record: the tooth and 
thigh bone, or the kingly ruins. (3) 
To be "puzzling" over remnants may well be the human 
condition, but the two metaphors develop quite different contexts 
for this state. The first comparison, between the historian and the 
scientist, allies the historian with the equally scholarly and 
objective researcher in the world of hard, measurable facts . The 
analogy is not, however, without ambiguities, for this scientist is 
"fumbling," and he must "reconstruct" a dinosaur from only a 
tooth and a thigh bone; however well-intentioned he is, however 
thorough his preparation, a great deal of imagination and many 
hypotheses are going to be needed in his task. And even the 
value of that task is questioned, for its object, Jeremiah, is hardly 
enhanced by the comparison to a "great, stupid beast," for while 
"great" indeed suggests the scope to which he aspired, "stupid" is 
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anything but ennobling. Moreover, to be "extinct" and destined 
only for a museum indicates a failure to have achieved the sort of 
timeless ideal that would make his search of enduring value. 
The second metaphor we have for this narrator's relation to his 
material reverses the terms absolutely. Instead of the 
contemporary scientific culture-hero, we have a "louse-bit 
nomad" whose "fumbling" results from purposeless wandering 
rather than attempting the scholarly challenge faced by the 
paleontologist. Dweller in the fruitless desert, he is dumbfounded 
by the "marvels" of civilized refinement whose traces he discovers 
by sheer accident rather than by the meticulous dental-picking of 
the archaeologist. Rather than a "stupid" and "extinct" beast, his 
quarry is a master race dwarfing the present, romantic heroes of a 
lost golden age towering above the squat shapes of a degenerate 
age. The first image draws us to the superior position occupied by 
the quintessential novelist, the omniscient narrator, who surveys 
with wit and wisdom the expanse of the fictional world and 
reconstructs it for the textual museum. The second, however, 
introduces the romantic elements this commentary upon it has 
suggested, and places us at the lowest point of entry in a quest for 
what Kiely termed "the cultivation of imagination and the 
supremacy of the self," a quest whose fulfillment is embodied in 
that mysterious "kind of men [who] had held the world before" 
this conceptually nomadic narrator undertook his task. By the 
first image, Jeremiah's fate is the logical consequence of 
attempting to enact a romantic ideology in a world that runs on 
realism; by the second, however, he is the last of those who had 
the greatness of spirit and vision to attempt the great role. Both 
Jererniahs are present in the novel, just as both narrators are, and 
in the strain between their sets of assumptions one finds that 
curiously destructive, parasitical quality Kiely argues as basic to 
the romantic novel. 12 
One result of this strain is that the narrator cannot rely fully 
upon either outlook as a basis for his judgments about Jeremiah's 
journal. Certainly he lacks the authority presumed by an 
omniscient novelist, but he also is diffident about deciding which 
of several possible readings of his sources is "right." Perhaps his 
interest in these ambiguities is part of his romantic focus upon the 
glimpses into subjectivity such passages permit. If so, he does not 
seem ultimately to reach any sure sense of a consciousness (his 
own or Jeremiah's) that would ground his interpretations and 
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make all the manifestations of that consciousness cohere. At one 
point, for example, he notes Jeremiah's stylistic preference for 
"terms of horror and condemnation" in his journal, 
as though he would cloak himself in the language of common 
report. Or did his motive lie deeper? Did that language 
cleanse his hands for the moment, and restore him to the 
society of men? Or when his own tongue condemned his act, 
did he relish the irony because at that moment he felt more 
free and secret in his inner self set off from the world? (248) 
This trifurcating explanation points to different ways of thinking 
about the implications of Jeremiah's style. The first reading (cliche 
as cloak) suggests that an authentic self is lost through immersion 
in the language of everyday gossip. The second, by contrast, 
reverses this valorization of individualism and prizes the place in 
the community he may have regained by seeing himself through 
their language rather than through his own. One explanation 
notes a lapse from a romantic drive to selfhood, the other an 
attempt to enter the community of realistic assumptions about 
actions and their values. The third, however, is a puzzle from 
either perspective. That is, the romantic "supremacy of self" Kiely 
mentions has become a more than Byronic version of the 
protagonist cut off from the norm by both egoism and crime. At 
the same time, the normal distance implied by realistic objectivity 
is grotesquely exaggerated; Jeremiah's "irony" opens so cold and 
so extreme a space between his expression and both his "inner 
self" and "the world" that any sense of moral relation, either to his 
own actions or to the community, seems lost somewhere in the 
act of verbal play. It is as if each of the two views had been taken 
so far as to meet its contrary in a diabolic inversion of the 
harmonies which Jeremiah sought in his life, and the narrator in 
his presentation of those materials. It may well be appropriate that 
the inversion should be signalled by irony, the means by which 
language tries to escape its limits by signalling an awareness of 
the distance between sign and referent. That is, the irony is 
"appropriate" in view of the manner in which romantic novels, as 
Kiely points out, "thrive like parasites on structures whose ruin is 
the source of their life." Here, the nature of the "ruin" is the 
mutually destructive criticism the "romantic" and the "novel" 
wage against each other's extreme form - exposing the solipsism 
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and anti-social irresponsibility of the romantic mode, and the 
sterility and self-alienation of the realistic. Moreover, it is a "ruin" 
evident not only in the unmistakable failures of Jeremiah's life, 
but also in the narrator's response of uncertainty to the key 
elements of both Jeremiah's life and his diary. Far from 
synthesizing these elements harmoniously, the narrator finds that 
the harder he tries to specify, the more clearly the strain between 
them shows. 
Another example indicates that this is not a confusion unique to 
Jeremiah's case. After Rachel's long-delayed confession of love to 
Jeremiah, the narrator asks, 
Had she spoken them [words of love] out of her own guilt as 
an expiation? Or out of pity for the very loneliness which 
made him reject her? Or had she spoken the truth when she 
said that she loved him because love was the only thing left, 
and you must have something, even to die? Or because the 
unwritten text of the drama that she and Jeremiah Beaumont 
acted out on their high and secret stage demanded this in the 
end? (377) 
Though at first glance these questions seem to be the objective 
historian's neutral list of possible motives, they actually propose 
four quite different conceptions of self and cosmos jostling for 
dominance in the narrator's mind. Rachel as a repentant sinner 
implies the universe of moral struggle; as an exquisite sensibility 
moved by pity, she is the pathetic heroine in a cosmic melodrama; 
as a desperate wretch under capital sentence, she is a naturalist 
victim ~ound down to the last emotion in her repertoire; as a role 
player, she is a slightly ludicrous stand-in for herself in a fabulist 
heroic drama. We move, in other words, in a romantic framework 
from a drama of moral absolutes to its degenerate form of 
sentimental drama, and in a realist framework from an austere 
awareness of the individual crushed by social forces beyond her 
control to its satirical form unveiling the private delusions that 
account for deviant or foolish behavior. None of these literary 
zones joined in the romantic novel is a resting point, however, 
because they all coexist within the conceptual tensions of the 
form. The coexistence of incompatible elements produces the sort 
of "dynamic antagonism" of which Kiely warned us, and accounts 
for the narrator's uncertainty as he juggles these different 
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conceptual structures for organizing his interpretation and 
presentation of the material. At the junction of two cultural 
traditions, the narrator is almost paralyzed by the surplus of 
frameworks available to him. 
At a few points in the narrative, he rises to something like an 
awareness of this dilemma, however, and tries to pass beyond the 
structural limits of the romantic novel. In trying to think beyond 
the ruin of these structures, his comments fulfill Kiely's other 
prediction about the genre's hostility to the forms and premises of 
tradition. For example, in an effort to preempt a too easy 
condescension to Jeremiah on the part of his readers, the narrator 
pauses about a quarter of the way into the novel, with 
implications that escape the local context: 
The gratuitous act: that was what he sought. But why did he 
seek it, the act outside the motives of the world? The answer 
is easy. It was the only way he knew to define himself, to 
create his world. We look back on his story, so confused and 
comic and pretentious and sad, and it seems very strange to 
us, for our every effort is to live in the world, to accept its 
explanations, to do nothing gratuitously. But is his story so 
strange? Explanations can only explain explanations, and the 
self is gratuitous in the end. (116) 
The first third of the comment seems pure Romanticism- the 
supreme self developing itself through the supra-rational 
discourse of the imagination, a self-authenticating, self-
grounding, self-creating plenitude of being. The middle sentence 
pictures us all by contrast as pure realists living in the world of 
straightforward explanations. The comment closes like a steel 
vise, however, crushing the two alternatives together until they 
are as flat as the page that gives rise to them. If "explanations can 
only explain explanations," then the discourse of either romance 
or realism embodies something like an intertextual circularity: the 
explanations cannot reach outside the text to the referent, to the 
self or the world they are about, rather than simply are. And if the 
self is "gratuitous," then the two meanings of that adjective 
become central for us. If the self is "unearned," like a gratuitous 
payment, then the romantic emphasis upon cultivating selfhood is 
unnecessary: the self is already there, paid out to the individual 
independent of his strivings, an act of ontological grace. If, at the 
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same time, the self is unjustified, like gratuitous criticism, then it 
cannot manifest the clear relations of cause and effect between 
essence and actions. The realist project of representing details and 
particulars in order to illustrate their implicit rationale becomes 
the imposition of an organic fiction upon chance contiguities. 
Is this a thinking beyond the impasse of the conflicting 
structures within the form of the romantic novel, or is it simply a 
moment of despair or near inarticulateness on the part of the 
narrator? One indication that World Enough and Time ventures a 
step beyond the two traditions on which it draws is the narrator's 
reflection upon a crucial moment in Jeremiah's journal. The 
protagonist comes to the point at which he feels "a numbness and 
the knowledge without even despair that my life was nothing and 
all I had ever done was nothing and meant nothing." The narrator 
comments at length: 
He had come to the "knowledge," he says. He says that, but 
we can scarcely believe him, for if he had come truly to the 
knowledge, would he have sat again the next day at his table 
and written down the account of all that Munn Short had 
said, and all that he himself had said, and the horror of his 
nightmare? With that knowledge what could have been the 
meaning of that act of recording? But he did write it, and the 
words are all there before us on the yellowing, curling sheets. 
Or is there the paradox that even in that knowledge, even 
when it is truly had, man must put down the words, must 
make the record? For even when that knowledge of blankness 
comes, he is still man and must "justify"? (392-3) 
For the romantic character, there could have been no "meaning of 
that act of recording," and for the realist narrator, there is no 
plausibility in Jeremiah's making the attempt. For the narrator 
striving to think beyond the impasse, however, there is the 
paradox of the alternative we have just explored - that man is a 
textual creature, and "must make the record" even if what he has 
is a "knowledge of blankness." There may only be the passion of 
recording, of "justifying" not in the sense of invoking 
transcendent or scientific laws explaining the ways of God and 
man, but of "justifying" the typographical margins of a life whose 
"selfhood" falls now between the quotation marks from opposing 
traditions (romaticism and realism), a textual creation of the 
55 SIEGLE 
interpreter- in first person, as in Jeremiah's journal, or in third, 
as in the novel at hand. Blankness, the absence of words or of 
what those words attempt to embody, may be the kind of 
knowledge to which Colonel Fort, the novel's other "hero," 
comes: "There is no sadness like the sadness of a man who knows 
the secrets of the world and of power, for only that man is forced 
to face the blankness of the last secret," the secret of "the man 
himself" (36-37). 
The narrator's speculations take us significantly beyond the 
heartening synthesis of romanticism and realism we might have 
expected from this hybrid genre, and in the "dynamic 
antagonism" and anti-conventional rebelliousness of its nature 
take "man," of whom we would expect an enriched definition, 
and all but lose him amidst the mutual criticism of its polar 
elements. 
We ought not neglect entirely the working out of this dilemma 
in the life and narrative of Jeremiah Beaumont, for they confirm 
the implicit critique of literary traditions we find in the narrator's 
commentary. Perhaps indicative of his general state of mind is his 
reaction to the pledge his lawyer, Mr. Madison, makes his wife: 
"Beaumont will never hang." 
Beaumont will never hang, the words tingled in Jeremiah's 
mind, as he watched Mr. Madison ascend the ladder and 
disappear. Beaumont will never hang, Beaumont will never hang, 
like the refrain of a ballad or old song forgotten from some 
desperate violence of long ago, the identity of the hero lost. 
He released Rachel horn his embrace, and stepped from 
her side. He took a few paces, and stopped, hearing the 
words in his head. 
But I am Beaumont, he thought. 
Then, I am Beaumont, and I will never hang. (362) 
Jeremiah is disoriented, strangely lost to himself, until he has the 
traditional form of the ballad to give him a sense of structure, and 
to enable him to identify himself with "the hero" long ago in 
romance's golden age. The last two lines set out a defective logic 
of identity by which he fills the slot in the heroic ballad with his 
own future. But that identity, the text says, is "lost," just as 
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Jeremiah's is to himself. Any possibility of a direct sense of 
himself is displaced by the mediating textual frameworks from 
which he derives his self-conception. 
At first, Jeremiah has absolute conviction in these textually 
based identities, as in his feeling "that the future was beyond 
plan, it already existed, he w:ould discover it step by step as he 
moved toward some 'flame, some point of light, beyond the murk 
and mist of things" (62). That his self is the very light of truth, 
pre-existent and only temporarily obscured by the "murk and 
mist" of daily existence, is as extreme a form of romantic certitude 
as one could imagine. Bit by bit, this conviction is chipped away. 
In one of the earliest passages in which he questions the grounds 
of his beliefs, he introduces the metaphor of gambling: 
And I asked myself how may we know that Justice is in the 
heart? There is no one to tell us. It is like a game, I said to 
myself, in which we place our coin upon a card, then tum the 
card to see if we win or lose, if on it or no is truly pictured 
the kingly face of Justice. 
Ah, but- and I put the last sad query to myself- can we 
ever see the other side of the card? Who will tell us? 
(122-3) 
The plaintive tone of the final question shows how keenly 
Jeremiah feels this version of the epistemological dilemma: the 
face of truth is forever turned from us, and there is no one to "tell 
us" if indeed we are right. 
The harder Jeremiah tries to overcome this dilemma, to wed the 
romantic search for selfhood with the realistic account of man in 
society, the closer he comes to a sense of the final failure of either 
effort. Jeremiah scribbles his later journal entries during an 
abortive return to nature that brings him closer to bestiality than 
to anything remotely resembling natural innocence. The narrator 
half summarizes, half quotes the insights Jeremiah reached 
struggling to come to terms with his destiny: 
But he came to know how hard it was "to know the 
inwardness and truth of things, for a man remembers what 
was the fact, but even as he remembers he knows the fact to 
be a fleeting shadow of something that passed, as when he 
looks at the ground and sees the swift shadow of a bird's 
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flight and lifts his eyes, but the hawk, or whatever bird it was 
that had swooped thus low, is gone." The truth would justify, 
for "if we can truly know the truth we know that it could 
never have been otherwise, and what we know to be true we 
can accept, for that is all the heart yearns for in the end." But 
it was hard to know. (379-80) 
That unambiguous beacon of the true self has now become what 
the heart can only yearn for. It would both "justify" one's life and 
enable one to "accept" one's lot, but as Jeremiah nears the end of 
his narrative line, he realizes this revelation is "hard to know," 
even impossible. For his image of the hawk shows how 
thoroughly Jeremiah has come to share the narrator's insight 
about "explanations." Even facts, the cornerstone of realism, are 
interpretations- they are but a "fleeting shadow of something 
that has passed" into the shadow of language. Far from knowing 
"whatever bird" he is, Jeremiah has at best only the shadow of a 
flight, trace rather than face. 
Moreover, the problem may be even more difficult than the 
effort to embody a metaphysical selfhood in the medium of 
language. Near the middle of the novel Jeremiah recalls the image 
of that point of light, but with a significant difference: 
And I thought how my own words had sprung from 
something in me I did not know the name or meaning for, 
and how a man moves in the darkness of himself, more 
trackless than the wild country, toward a light which 
glimmers far away. But he does not know what the light may 
be. (And now that all has come to pass, do I know?) (172) 
Both name and meaning disappear for Jeremiah as the self that 
was to be a beacon beyond time and space has become a mystery 
which "glimmers far away" in the "trackless" region that 
knowledge cannot reach. But what if the "something in me" from 
which these words spring is not the unified spiritual unity 
Jeremiah seeks, but the internalized beliefs of the culture outside 
him? What if "he" is blankness, as the narrator suggests, and his 
"words" are always only the world's? He comes close to grasping 
this possibility after overhearing gossip suggesting that he 
married for security. Shaken and shamed, Jeremiah observes in 
his journal that 
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If a man lives by what he feels to be the truth in him, and 
discovers in a single instant that the tongue of the world says 
differently of him, there comes the fear and shame that what 
he had held to be the truth in him may not be the truth after 
all and there may be no truth for him but the terrible truth 
now given him by the tongue of the world. And if a man is 
robbed of his truth, and of a sudden, how can he know what 
he is? (164) 
The six occurrences of "tongue" in this passage keep the truth of 
selfhood linguistic and hence, as Jeremiah feels, relative to the 
cultural consensus ("the tongue of the world") rather than to a 
metaphysical"truth in him." 
Jeremiah appears at such a moment on the verge of seeing how 
completely the existence of selfhood, not to mention our concept 
of it, depends upon the way men speak of it. He has learned the 
discourse of realism from Colonel Fort and that of romanticism 
from his philosophy and his novels, but finds himself all but lost 
between their conflicting conventions. It is thus with nostalgia 
that he speaks at the very end of "a way I have missed," "a way 
whereby the word becomes flesh . . . [and] the flesh becomes 
word." Such a union would appear to be the ultimate aim of the 
romantic novel, but this narrative suggests that one cannot help 
but miss a way that is less a union than the split identity of a 
fictional subgenre and, ultimately perhaps, of a culture. 
World Enough and Time thus appears to offer a surprising 
response to the "unresolved struggle" of the traditional romantic 
novel: the very project draws together two fundamental traditions 
in our culture in a way that frustrates both, causing them to 
publish the improbabilities of each other's assumptions. Karl 
Kroeber's conclusions in Romantic Narrative Art give us a point of 
perspective upon the generic issue. Basic to romantic narrative, he 
argues, is "the experience of an individual's journey through past 
errors and present confusions to a private intuition of universal 
harmony." 13 This intuition, clearly, is Jeremiah's goal, but certainly 
not his achievement. For framing his effort is that of a modern 
historian to represent, and thus to explain, a life gone wrong. 
This narrator seems to view the gap between Jeremiah's reach and 
grasp as an inevitable one, and though he shares with his subject 
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some nostalgia for the goals of romance, he nonetheless draws 
out Jeremiah's own increasing doubts about its basic assumptions 
and adds to them his own. As we have seen, however, his 
realistic framework also suffers wear from these experiences, and 
we have not a simple reversal of romance to realism, but a 
recognition that they are only alternative explanations which fail 
to comprehend the whole territory they seek to map. That, in fact, 
may be the point behind Warren's elaborate narrative structure, 
dense with its overlapping frames, its historical data, and its 
double-decker commentary. Kroeber notes that romantic narrative 
"seems to be the mode toward which an experimenting, 
innovating poet, or a poet unsure of his traditions, perhaps even 
in rebellion against specialized literary conventions, will naturally 
turn .... "14 That collection of attitudes towards tradition 
(experimentation, innovation, uncertainty, rebellion) may be the 
inevitable modern gloss upon the frustrations apparent in what 
we have in the way of a canon of romantic novels. 
World Enough and Time shows us how the sanity, or wholeness, 
of Jeremiah Beaumont is torn apart by trying to live through the 
premises of both traditions at once. His effort to take both to the 
limit exhausts their pretensions to the absolute reference points, 
Self and Reality, to which they aspire. Hence Jeremiah finds only 
an opposition between an awesome blankness of the self (or 
Nature) and the confusing, often conflicting conventional 
perspectives with which the culture socializes its members. The 
reference points are cultural rather than metaphysical or natural, 
and hence are subject to the conceptual limitations of their 
underlying assumptions. We have looked closely at the passages 
in which Jeremiah, like Colonel Fort, discovers the final blankness 
of the self, and a similar emptiness characterizes the wilderness 
life on the island of the Grand Bosse. The pure beacon of romantic 
selfhood flickers down to an unreachable glimmer; the wilderness 
induces a bestial, nonhuman existence; and society's exemplar-
Colonel Fort- turns out to be as morally ambiguous as the 
political issues and processes of the day. Jeremiah can neither 
escape into selfhood nor merge with society; neither romanticism 
nor realism in their pure forms can suffice. 
We might conclude, then, that in the ruin of certain 
assumptions about realist objectivity and romantic selfhood, 
World Enough and Time manages a form of the romantic novel in 
which we can see critically a cultural symbiosis of alternative 
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"explanations." Selfhood, the putative referent of that explanatory 
symbiosis, turns out instead to be its "gratuitous" product. Rather 
than simply repeating the contradictions inherent in the 
traditional form of this subgenre, World Enough and Time thus 
identifies the points at which two central attitudes of our culture 
overreach themselves in their efforts to establish a sense of 
selfhood on the grounds either of transcendental romanticism or 
social realism. The inability of either narrator to achieve the kind 
of "truth" to which he aspires is not therefore a personal failure to 
reconcile these conflicting conventions, but rather the necessary 
shortcoming of the conventions themselves, mystified by their 
~espective philosophical naivete. World Enough and Time seems to 
brirlg its reader to the very brink of a post-metaphysical vision of 
selfhood, but a vision that is unfortunately beyond the ability of 
either of its narrators to conceive. Jeremiah discovers that neither 
he, his "garden" in the wilderness, nor the society that begins to 
emerge on the frontier can function as pure ideals. The historian's 
efforts to wrest from documents a true order of things or of 
persons meets an equally final frustration, for his commitment to 
realism is not enough to enable that method to make the great 
leap from discourse to Truth. It may well be, then, that in 
pointing out that the romantic novel was always an impossible 
dream, World Enough and Time emphasizes the spatia-temporal 
limitations implicit in its title for both that genre and the culture 
that continues to depend upon its dual strategies for creating 
meaning, whether separately or, as in the subgenre, in uneasy 
tandem. It is too much to call World Enough and Time a novel to 
end all novels, but it seems to mark at least the fictive starting 
point of its own and, perhaps, of all cultural discourse. 
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